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Dimensions of the Constitutioncal
Obligation to Provide A Forum
BY JoHN RI. ..,nRvs
AN OVERvIEW OF THE OBLIGATION
In the more than twenty years since the United States
Supreme Court held in Hughes v. Fetter' that Wisconsin was
obligated to provide a forum to hear an action based on the
wrongful death statute of Illinois, the Court has done little to
clarify the far-reaching implications of this case. This paper will
attempt to interpret these implications in regard to the well-
known choice of law concepts of the public policy veto, the refusal
of a state to provide a forum for suits based on the penal statutes
of other states, and the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The
chief concern is the interaction of the constitutional obligation to
provide a forum with the application of these three doctrines,
each of which may in some circumstances allow a state to refuse
to serve as a forum. The contention of this paper is that the
boundaries of these three doctrines are constitutionally determined
and that it is possible to predict the present dimensions of these
boundaries.
Hughes v. Fetter involved a suit under the Illinois wrongful
death statute.2 The suit was brought in the state courts of Wis-
consin, the domicile of the decedent, Harold Hughes, who had
been killed in an auto crash in Illinois while a passenger in an
auto driven by Fetter, also a domiciliary of Wisconsin. The
Fetter auto was insured by a Wisconsin insurer, which was joined
in the wrongful death action as a defendant.3 The Wisconsin
trial court had disposed of the case on a summary judgment
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston College of Law; B.B.A.,
Texas (El Paso); J.D., New Mexico; LL.M., Columbia. The thoughtful comments
of Willis L. M. Reese during the final preparation of this Article are acknowledged
with gratitude.
'1341 U.S. 609 (1951).
2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70 §§ 1 & 2 (1971).3 Hughes v. Fetter, 42 N.W.2d 452, 453 (Wis. 1950).
KENTucKy LAw JouRAL[
motion by the defendants, and this decision was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin4 because of the unusual construction
placed on the Wisconsin wrongful death statute by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. Having noted that the Wisconsin wrongful death
statute could only apply to wrongful deaths which had occurred
in Wisconsin, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that this
was indicative of a legislative policy against allowing the state
courts of Wisconsin to hear suits for wrongful deaths occurring
outside Wisconsin, even if the basis of such suits was not the
wrongful death statute of Wisconsin but the wrongful death
provisions of a sister state. Therefore, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that it was contrary to the public policy of Wisconsin
for a state court to entertain a suit under the Illinois wrongful
death statute for a death which had occurred in Illinois.5 In
reaching this conclusion, the Wisconsin court ruled that their
construction and application of the Wisconsin wrongful death
statute did not violate the full faith and credit clause of the
United States Constitution.6
In a short opinion by Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court in
Hughes held that the refusal of Wisconsin to provide a forum for
this action was violative of the full faith and credit provisions
of the federal Constitution.7 The Court reached this conclusion
on the grounds that in reality Wisconsin had no public policy
against actions for wrongful death,8 as indeed they could not
since they had a wrongful death statute of their own. The Court
was quite careful in its holding to specify that it was merely
requiring that Wisconsin provide a forum for the hearing of this
wrongful death action and not holding thereby that Wisconsin
was, after opening its doors to this suit, obligated to apply the
Illinois wrongful death statute rather than its own.' Restricting
the holding to the issue of.access rather than to the issue of
choice of law is one which will later be examined at length.
One year after the decision in Hughes, the policy against
4Id. at 456.
5 Id. at 455.
6Id. at 453. The United States Constitution provides: "Full Faith and Cred&
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings
of every other State. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
7 341 U.S. at 612, 613.
8 Id. at 612.
9 Id. at 612 n.10.
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entertaining wrongful death suits for deaths occurring outside the
state was once again faced by the Court in First National Bank of
Chicago v. United Air Lines, Inc.,10 a case which first arose in
the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
Suit had been brought in federal court under the wrongful death
statute of Utah" to recover for the death of an Illinois domiciliary
in an airplane crash in Utah. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a
summary judgment in favor of the defendant" on the basis of the
Illinois wrongful death statute which provided that:
... [N]o action shall be brought or prosecuted in this State to
recover for damages for a death occurring outside this State
where a right of action for such death exists under the laws of
the place where such death occurred and service of process in
such suit may be had on the defendant in such place.13
The Seventh Circuit distinguished this fact situation from Hughes
v. Fetter on the grounds that whereas Justice Black had noted in
Hughes that failure of Wisconsin to entertain the suit might
result in the loss of a remedy, there was no such danger in First
National since the Illinois statute explicitly allowed suit in Illinois
if such suit were not possible elsewhere.14
The Supreme Court did not find this distinction to be material.
In a very short opinion by Mr. Justice Black, it was held that
the federal district court sitting in Illinois was obligated by full
faith and credit to hear the case.' 5 The case is of significance
since the facts are such (death occurring in Utah without any
strong human connection with Illinois and Utah being the most
probable location of any witnesses) that the case would be one
suitable for transfer from the federal district court in Illinois to a
federal district court in Utah.'0 Accordingly, First National may
103 42 U.S. 396 (1952).
11 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-7 (1953).
12 First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, Inc., 190 F.2d 493 (7th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 903 (1951), cert. granted, 342 U.S. 875 (1951).
13 ILL. LAWS 916, § 1 [1935]. This restriction was deleted when this sec-
tion was amended in 1963, ILL. LAWS 3248, § 1 [1963], codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (Supp. 1973).
14 190 F.2d at 494-95.
15 342 U.S. at 398.
30 Transfer from one federal forum to another is available: "For the con-
venience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought." 28 U.S.C. § o1404(a) (1970).
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be interpreted to mean that there is a constitutional obligation
to provide a forum even where the forum provided may eventually
be forsaken in favor of another.
A third case involved with the problem of the obligation to
provide a forum pre-dates both Hughes and First National. In
Broderick v. Rosner,17 the Supreme Court held that full faith
and credit obliged the state courts of New Jersey to entertain a
suit against New Jersey residents who held stock in a New York
bank.18 The suit was brought to collect the full obligations of the
New Jersey residents to the New York bank, as provided by New
York statute. 9 The opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis held that
New Jersey was obligated to entertain the suit despite the fact
that such suit might be contrary to the public policy of New
Jersey.20 Although Broderick might be distinguished from both
Hughes and First National on the grounds that the obligation
sought to be enforced in Broderick was contractual rather than
tortious, this does not seem to be a material distinction.
Considering the Supreme Court decisions in Hughes, First
National, and Broderick, it would seem that the Court has, within
this narrow range of circumstances, held that the full faith and
credit clause obligates states to provide a forum. However, even
this seemingly clear conclusion is not free from question. A com-
pelling argument has been made for the conclusion that the
constitutional provision which required service as a forum in
each of these three instances was the equal protection clause of
the federal Constitution rather than the full faith and credit
provision." This position is of course directly opposed to the
clear language of the Court in each of these cases. The proponent
of the position, Brainerd Currie, felt that the result (i.e., reversal
of state court for refusal to provide a forum) would have been
the same in Hughes had the decedent been killed in Canada
rather than Illinois, and that this fact negated the possibility of
17 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
18 Id. at 647.
19 N.Y. BANKING LAw § 113-a (McKinney 1971)
20 294 U.S. at 644.
21 Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 HAMv. L.
3E. 6, 62-66 (1959). The United States Constitution provides:
No State shall mae or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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the decision being based on full faith and credit. This is so
because full faith and credit applies only to sister states and if
the same result would follow in a case involving a foreign country,
the source of the requirement must instead be equal protection.22
Substantial support for the equal protection argument seems
to come from Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co.,23 in which the
Supreme Court stated that the basis of the holdings in both
Hughes and First National was discrimination, 24 but this is difficult
to accept in the face of the language of the Court in Hughes
explicitly indicating that full faith and credit was the basis of
the holding. Of course, the statement in Wells does not preclude
the possibility that the basis of the holding in both these cases
was full faith and credit. One might conclude that when a state
discriminates against the statutes of a sister state there is a ful
faith and credit problem. Currie asserted in his equal protection
argument that "[o]ne does not discriminate against causes of
action, but against people."25 The fact that in the last analysis
all discrimination affects persons does not mean that primary
discrimination against statutes is permissible, especially in a
federal union with a unifying principle such as full faith and
credit. If the existing discrimination is against the statute of a
sister state, the principle governing the area is full faith and credit.
The position of full faith and credit manifested in Hughes, First
National, and Broderick is not to be ignored just because the
underlying basis of each case was discrimination. This is not in
any way to question Currie's assumption that Hughes would have
reached the same result had the accident occurred in Canada;
in such instance the obligation to provide a forum would have
come from equal protection. It is simply to say that this fact
does not alter the conclusion that the basis of Hughes and the
other cases was full faith and credit. One would not say that the
basis of the holding in John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. Yates28 was not the full faith and credit clause (as the Supreme
22 Currie, supra note 21, at 62-66.
233 45 U.S. 514 (1953).
24 Id. at 518-19.
25 Currie, supra note 21, at 63.
20 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
John Hancock involved a suit on a life insurance policy which had been issued
in New York to a New York domiciliary. At the time of the application for the
policy in New York, the applicant had represented that he had not recently been(Continued on next page)
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Court clearly indicated that it was) simply because in a case
similar on material facts the basis of a similar holding was said
to be due process2 7
While the exact constitutional provision giving rise to the
obligation to provide a forum is quite important from a scholarly
point of view, it is not necessary to know the exact source of the
obligation in order to achieve the goal of this paper. It is enough
to conclude that there exists in certain fact situations a constitu-
tional obligation to provide a forum. The intent here is to map
the limits of this obligation in relation to the concepts of public
policy, penal statute enforcement, and forum non conveniens. An
examination of the exceptions to this obligation should give a
clearer picture of the dimensions of the obligation itself.
Ti BAR OF PUBLIC POLICY
Since the basis of the refusal of the various states in Hughes,
First National, and Broderick was that access was against the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
under medical care. In fact the applicant was at that time being treated for cancer.
This misrepresentation was a complete defense to a suit under the policy according
to New York law. The insured died, and his widow moved to Georgia and there
brought suit on the policy. The widow recovered under the Georgia rule that
such misrepresentation would not defeat recovery if the agent soliciting the
poi had knowledge of the misrepresentation. The question of misrepresentation
had been determined by the jury in Georgia under the theory that this was a
matter of procedure to be governed by the law of the forum. The Supreme
Court reversed the decision due to a total lack of material contacts with the
forum, finding such application of Georgia law to be violative of full faith and
credit. The case indicates that an attempt to label a matter of substance as
procedural will not save it from review it the state lacks sufficient contacts tojustify application of its substantive law.
27 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
This case involved a lawsuit arising from the loss in Mexican waters of a
boat insured by a Mexican insurance company. The insurer had reinsured the
loss with two New York insurance companies. The original policy had been issued
to a man named Bonner, who had assigned the policy to Dick. In addition to hav-
ing been issued in Mexico, the policy provided that coverage only existed while
the boat was in Mexican waters, that losses would be payable in Mexican cur-
rency, and the policy was to be subject to Mexican law. The policy contained a
one year limitation on the bringing of actions for loss, a provision which was
valid under Mexican law. The boat was lost and the assignee, Dick, brought suit
more than one year after the loss in the state courts of Texas, which was his
domicile. Texas invalidated the one year limitation on the basis of a statute for-
bidding a limitation of less than two years, and the case went to the United States
Supreme Court on appeal, where it was held that Texas lacked sufficient contacts
with the case to apply its statutory provision and that its having done so was
violative of due process.
Both Home Insurance and John Hancock stand for the premise that a state
forum which lacks sufficient contacts cannot constitutionally apply its own sub-
stantive law. This constitutional control comes from due process in the case
involving a foreign country (Home Insurance) and from full faith in the case
involving a sister state (John Hancock).
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public policy of the forum, this concept of public policy as a bar
to access will be examined first. It was a principle of conflicts law
long before codification in the Restatement (First) of Conflicts
that "[n]o action can be maintained upon a cause of action created
in another state the enforcement of which is contrary to the public
policy of the forum."28 The same basic idea has been incorporated
in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts provision.29
It is necessary at this point to recall the implicit distinction in
Hughes between the public policy veto as a choice of law rule
and as a bar of access to a court. Under vested rights"0 the use of
public policy as a choice of law rule was an absolutely necessary
device which gave the system a flexibility without which it could
not have functioned. As a choice of law rule the public policy
veto has no place in an interest analysis system3' since such
28 RFsrATENmNT (FIRsT) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 612 (1934).
29 The Restatement (Second) provides that "[n]o action will be entertained on
a foreign cause of action the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong public
policy of the forum." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 90 (1969.).30 Vested rights is that choice of law system espoused by Professor Beale,
who was the reporter for the Restatement (First) of Conflicts. At the heart of the
system is the concept of legislative jurisdiction. The basic idea is that at the
moment a thing occurs, the rights surrounding it are vested and cannot thereafter
be altered. Therefore, in an auto accident in State X, the rights of all the parties
are vested under the law of X. Since the ace~dent occurred within the physical
boundaries of X, no other state law can determine the rights and liabilities of theparties. It is then the duty of whatever forum called upon to hear a suit in-
volving the accident to apply the law of X to the case. It is said that this system
is capable of uniformity and certainty due to this concept of attachment of rights
and widespread enforceability thereafter. However, the system is subject to
manipulation since the forum is required only to enforce the substantive rules
of the state where the rights vested and may apply its own procedural rules.
Furthermore, the forum is not required to enforce foreign rules which are contrary
to its own public policy. Since the point of vesting will vary according to the
type of case involved, the forum can manipulate the result by its characterization
of the case, for example, denominating it as a contract case (or, for that matter,
putting it into any one of numerous legal pigeon holes) rather than a tort problem.
ai Interest analysis is a very broad description of the choice of law theories
which have sprung up as alternatives to the rigid vested rights system. The
approach of scholars has varied to such a degree that no brief summary of the
area is possible. The outstanding works of the late Brainerd Currie have im-
mense effects on all who work in this area. See generally B. CuRmre, SELECTED
ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAW (1963). The work of Robert Leflar, see gen-
erally R. LEFLAR, AmEmcAN CONFLICTS LAW (1968), seems to be finding a good
deal of favor in recent court decisions. Though the various scholars may have
differing methods of dealing with the choice of law process, they share a com-
mon factor which gives rise to the term "interest analysis." The basic idea is that
before one can make a choice of law, it is necessary to analyze the policies which
underlie the rules in question. In the case of two competing rules, it is oftenpossible to see that the policy behind one rule will not be furthered by its
application to the facts at hand. Obviously, in this simple situation, the rule
whose policies will be furthered is the correct one to apply. The situation is a
bit more difficult when both rules have relevant policies but one clearly out-
weighs the other, and of course, is most difficult when both rules have strong
(Continued on next page)
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system has by definition taken into consideration the public
policy of the forum in reaching a decision to apply the law of a
particular jurisdiction to a particular issue. In a situation in which
a suit with contacts only in State X is brought in State Y, State Y
would not choose to apply its own law under the interest analysis,
and it would probably be forbidden by due process to decide
otherwise. In this situation State Y might be able to avoid pro-
vision of a forum on the basis of forum non conveniens, but if the
full faith and credit commands are to have optimum effect, State
Y should not be able to avoid this responsibility on the basis of
public policy. In the more common situation where there are
sufficient contacts for State Y to apply either its own law or that
of State X, if State Y decides that the law of State X is properly
applicable, it should not be able to avoid that choice on the basis
of public policy. To allow a public policy veto after an interest
analysis choice, as was done in vested rights, would simply mean
that the choice itself had been incorrect.
In contrast to use as a choice of law principle, however, the
public policy veto may be used to deny access to a forum. As
previously noted, the concept has no place in a modem choice
of law system and, as correctly noted in the Restatement (Second)
of Conflicts, it should not even be used in a vested rights juris-
diction to strike a defense based on foreign law once the decision
to entertain a suit based on foreign law has been made.32 The
only remaining use, at least as limited herein and contemplated
by the Restatement (Second),83 is that of a tool for denial of access
to a forum. Even this very narrow use seems to be at odds with
the prior position taken on the issue by the Restatement (Second)
Reporter, Professor Willis Reese of Columbia Law School. Shortly
after the decision in Hughes v. Fetter, Professor Reese argued
for a hard and fast rule of access regardless of the public policy
of the forum. 4 Whether this dichotomy between Reese in his
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
policies and application of either rule will do violence to the policies of the other.
It is in these more difficult situations that the scholarly camps of interest analysis
differ in their handling of the choice of law. The variations are significant, but it
is also important to note that all share the common ground of policy consideration
prior to the making of a choice.8 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLicrs OF LA:ws § 90, Comment a (1969).
83 Id. at Comment c.
34 Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of Public Policy, 19
U. Cu. L. REv. 339 (1952).
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early writings and the Restatement (Second) is a result of a change
in his personal thinking or was made at the insistence of the
American Law Institute is unknown. The position of this paper
is that Reese's early theory calling for an absolute rule of access
regardless of public policy is constitutionally required. This posi-
tion is preferable not only because it is easier to administer, but
also because it is the only rule which will correctly implement
the constitutional requirement of full faith and credit. A weaker
rule would not fully effectuate the strong unifying principle of
full faith and credit.
It is well settled that a judgment rendered in one state is
entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of sister states, even
if such judgment would not have been rendered in the second
state due to its public policy." Given this strong constitutional
compulsion in regard to judgments, it must be asked why a state
statute is not entitled to at least enough faith and credit to gain
access to forums in sister states. The clear language of the con-
stitutional compulsion of full faith and credit certainly does not
distinguish between judgments and statutes. Although it cannot
be said that every state statute is entitled to prevail in the courts
of sister states (since to do so would mean that in a two-state
situation a forum would always have to defer to foreign law, and
in a three-or-more-state situation a forum could not make a choice
which would satisfy full faith and credit), the unifying principle
of full faith and credit should surely go so far as to compel each
state to serve as a forum for most actions based on the laws of
sister states. As will be noted later, this strict rule of access may
be relaxed in regard to penal statutes and under forum non con-
veniens, but the concept of public policy should not play any
part in this decision. The rule here supported seems consistent
with the spirit of the Restatement (Second), although it would
constitutionally remove the limited area of discretion allowed
by the Restatement.36 A survey of the cases in which public
policy was used as a device to prevent access to a court will
reveal the abuse to which the device has been subjected and
should highlight the need for a clear holding that access is
required by full faith and credit.
35~ See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Luni, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).So RESTATEMIENT (SFCO,-M) OF~ CONrLICTS OF LAWvS § 90, Comment c (1969).
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The Supreme Court's earliest discussion of public policy as a
device for denying access to a forum was in Bank of Augusta v.
Earle.37 In that case the Court held that Alabama was compelled
to hear a suit by a Georgia banking corporation based on a con-
tract to purchase notes which had been made in Alabama by an
agent of the bank. The Court found that the Georgia corporation
was authorized to make such purchases by its charter and that it
could enforce its contracts in Alabama on the same basis as a
natural person. Having reached this conclusion, the Court then
held that it was not contrary to the public policy of Alabama to
allow such suits for the enforcement of contracts to purchase
notes.38 Implicit in the decision is the assumption that had such
suits actually been contrary to the public policy of Alabama, the
suit need never have been entertained. Any attempt by the state
courts of Alabama to interpret their public policy in a manner
other than that found by the Supreme Court would have been a
violation of full faith and credit. Although this holding clearly
does not support an absolute rule of access, it does seem to in-
dicate that the dimensions of public policy in regard to questions
of access to a forum are set by the federal Constitution.
Subsequent to the early holding of the Supreme Court in
Bank of Augusta, but still a considerable time prior to the holding
in Broderick, the Court held that Wisconsin was obliged by full
faith and credit to provide a forum for suit by the receiver of a
Minnesota corporation on statutory double liability for stock price
pursuant to Minnesota law.8 9 The Wisconsin Supreme Court had
held that to allow such suit by a receiver where the obligation
had not been reduced to judgment in Minnesota was contrary to
the public policy in Wisconsin.40 The United States Supreme
Court held that the nature of the double liability was such that
only Minnesota could have any public policy on the matter, and
hence such suit could not be contrary to the public policy of
Wisconsin;41 the error in defining public policy was violative of
full faith and credit. This holding illustrates the ability of the
Supreme Court to define the dimensions of public policy in much
3738 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
38 Id. at 597.
39 Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 260 (1912).
40 Converse v. Hamilton, 118 N.W. 190, 191 (Wis. 1908).
41 224 U.S. at 260.
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the same manner that they have defined the dimensions of penal
laws.42 Given the fact that the same constitutional compulsion,
full faith and credit, is operating in this area of access to a forum
as was in force in the area of the interstate effects of judgments,
it would seem to be constitutionally required that the Court
undertake the definition of limitations placed on the public policy
concept to an even greater extent. Since such work has been
done in setting the limits of penal judgments, a similar effort is
necessary in the area of public policy.
An example of the abuse of public policy and an instance in
which application of a constitutional definition of public policy
would have produced a better result is Sunbeam Corp. v. Masters
of Miami, Inc.43 Suit was brought for damages and for an injunc-
tion to prevent interference with fair trade contracts between
Sunbeam and its distributors who were located in states having
fair trade laws. Sunbeam alleged that Masters had induced these
distributors to sell Sunbeam products to Masters at prices in
violation of fair trade agreements. The trial court dismissed the
action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, and the Fifth Circuit upheld the dismissal, reasoning
that since Florida had no fair trade law the maintenance of such
suit was contrary to the public policy of Florida.44 Although
this was dicta since the actual holding of the case was that no
right to sue for a violation of a fair trade agreement existed under
Florida law, it is clear evidence of the lengths to which the
concept of public policy may preclude provision of a forum. It
seems possible that the suit was based on the fair trade legislation
of sister states. The majority cited no authority to show that the
public policy of Florida was opposed to such a suit based on the
law of sister states, only that it was opposed to such suits based
on its own law. The lack of such contrary public policy was
evidenced by the repeated passage of fair trade legislation by the
Florida legislature.4 5 The only reason that Florida had no fair
trade legislation in force was that the Supreme Court of Florida
42 For the definition of penal laws required in deciding whether or not a
judgment is entitled to full faith and credit see Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657
(1892), and text accompanying notes 98-101 infra.
43 225 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1955).
44 Id. at 198.
45 Id. at 199 (Rives, J., dissenting).
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had repeatedly held such legislation to be unconstitutional. 46
Sunbeam is a clear example of the courts of one state discriminat-
ing against the laws of sister states. Since the Sunbeam Court
misinterpreted the public policy of Florida, the resulting denial
of access to a forum for the suit based on the laws of a sister state
is a violation of the constitutional requirement of full faith and
credit. Under no circumstances should the public policy of
Florida be allowed to close the doors of the Florida courts to
this particular suit, and surely such closing cannot be tolerated
when based on a faulty interpretation of the public policy of
that state.
Some light on the question of access for intervention purposes
is shed by Peresipka v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway,47 a case
in which the Seventh Circuit held that Indiana was constitu-
tionally obliged to provide a forum to hear the claim of an Illinois
attorney in regard to compensation for his work on a case in
Illinois. The attorney had been retained in Illinois to handle a
claim made under the Federal Employers Liability Act.48 After
the attorney commenced the suit in Illinois on behalf of the injured
party, he was dismissed and the plaintiff then retained new
counsel and brought the action in Indiana. The plaintiff recovered
a judgment in Indiana, and the Illinois attorney sought to share
in the judgment under an Illinois statute creating an attorney's
lien under such circumstances. 49 The federal trial court refused
to allow such intervention on the grounds that this would be
contrary to the public policy of Indiana. The Seventh Circuit
reversed, holding that enforcement of the claim was not contrary
to the public policy of Indiana and adding that such intervention
was constitutionally required by the full faith and credit clause
as construed in Hughes.5" Peresipka stands for the proposition
that, in addition to the constitutional obligation to serve as a
forum discussed above, there are circumstances in which there is
a constitutional obligation to allow intervention in a suit already
being heard. This is a wise expansion of the Hughes doctrine
46 Id.
47281 F.2d 268 (7th Cir. 1956).
4845 U.S.C. §§ 51 etseq. (1970).
4 9 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 18, § 14 (1968), as amended ILn. REv. STAT. ch. 18, §
14 (Supp. 1978).
50 281 F.2d at 275.
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since failure to intervene will often result in a claim which could
have been asserted by intervention becoming barred by res
judicata. Intervention in such cases is quite close to the forum
provision problem of Hughes, since the only forum in which the
claim may be asserted may be the one initially hearing the claim.
Problems of res judicata and long arm jurisdiction could make
intervention a right of constitutional dimensions, although it is
difficult to believe that a claim denied intervention would be
barred by res judicata.
In addition to the issue of intervention, the constitutional
obligation to provide a forum has significance in the area of third
party practice. In Millsap v. Central Wisconsin Motor Transport
Co.,51 the Supreme Court of Illinois held that in a suit brought
by an Illinois resident against an Illinois corporation, the corpora-
tion must be allowed to implead the estate of a decedent joint
tortfeasor for contribution as provided by Wisconsin law,5' since
Illinois had no policy against contribution. It is interesting to
note that the Illinois court felt obliged to reach this result because
of the full faith and credit clause as construed in Hughes and First
National. And though this opinion in regard to the constitutional
obligation is at most dicta since Illinois had no public policy
against contribution, the implication is that impleader would
have been allowed due to full faith and credit even had Illinois
had such a policy. Since Wisconsin law was properly applicable
to the litigation, impleader was constitutionally required regard-
less of the public policy of Illinois.
Furthermore, the issue of substitution of parties also seems
to have a constitutional dimension. The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit in Jones v. Schellenberger 3 held that in a
suit by a Texas administratrix against an Illinois resident in an
Illinois federal court for the death of a Texas resident, refusal to
substitute an administrator appointed in Illinois for the Texas
administratrix was correct.54 The Court of Appeals felt that such
substitution would be violative of full faith and credit as con-
strued in First National because it would discriminate against the
53 189 N.E.2d 793 (IM. App. 1963).
52 Id. at 796-97.
53 196 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied sub nom. LeReau v. Jones, 344
U.S. 876 (1952).
54 Id. at 855.
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Texas administratrix.r 5 However, the application of First National
is dicta since the actual holding in Jones is that the question of
substitution in a federal court is to be governed by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure rather than by state rules. Nevertheless,
once again it is the implication of the case that is significant, and
the clear implication is that such substitution would have been
improper even in a state court since it would have been dis-
criminatory and hence violative of full faith and credit.
The question of whether a state is constitutionally obliged to
provide a forum for suits under the direct action statutes of sister
states has caused considerable difficulty, although there are few
states with direct action statutes and hence this troublesome
question has not often been faced. The difficulty of the problem
is illustrated by the experience of the Illinois judiciary in dealing
with suits based on the direct action statute of Wisconsin. In
Posner v. Traveler's Insurance Co.,56 the first Illinois case on the
issue, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois held that Illinois was obliged to provide a forum for a
suit under the Wisconsin direct action statute7 by a resident of
Illinois against a Connecticut insurance company doing business
in both Michigan and Illinois when the policy in question had
been issued in Michigan to a Michigan resident and the accident
which gave rise to the suit had occurred in Wisconsin. 8 The trial
court found that although the Wisconsin direct action statute
purported to limit suits based on it to those brought in the courts
of Wisconsin, this was a mere venue restriction which was invalid
under the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Ten-
nessee Coal, Iron, and Railroad v. George,59 and hence suit was
55 Id.56 244 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
5 7 WIs. STAT. § 260.11(1) (1957), as amended Wis. STAT. § 260.11(1)
(Supp. 1973).
58 244 F. Supp. at 870.
59233 U.S. 354 (1914), which involved a suit brought in Georgia by an
employee of the railroad who had been injured in the course of employment in
Alabama. The basis of the suit was an Alabama statute making the railroad liable
to the employee if the injury had been caused by the machinery of the railroad
during the course of employment. The issue was whether or not the claim could
be heard in a Georgia court in view of the fact that the Alabama statute creating
the right provided that actions to enforce such liability were required to be
brought in the state of Alabama. The Supreme Court held that this venue limitation
could not keep the courts of a sister state from entertaining a transitory claim for
damages, therefore entertaining the suit was held not to be violative of full faith
and credit to the laws of Alabama.
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appropriate under the statute in Illinois. The trial court concluded
that suit under the statute was not contrary to the public policy
of Illinois, and indicated that any attempt to prevent this suit
by the device of public policy would be violative of full faith
and credit as construed in both Hughes and First National. Once
again this is dicta since Illinois was held to have no such policy,
but it would have been dispositive had such a policy existed.
Although the contention here is that both the dicta and the hold-
ing in Posner were correct, unfortunately neither are the law in
Illinois at this time.
A federal court in Illinois hearing a case similar to Posner at
the present time would no longer be able to allow suit under the
Wisconsin direct action statute because of the holding of the
Illinois Supreme Court in Marchlik v. Coronet Insurance Co.60
This involved a suit by a Wisconsin plaintiff against two Illinois
insurance companies for injuries sustained in an auto crash in
Wisconsin. The driver of the car in which the plaintiff was a
passenger was a Wisconsin resident, the driver of the auto with
which they collided was a Wisconsin resident, and both autos
were registered in Wisconsin.6' The Illinois Supreme Court re-
fused to hear the case because suit based on the direct action
statute of Wisconsin was allegedly contrary to the public policy
of Illinois.62 A concurring opinion indicated that this refusal to
provide a forum because of the public policy of Illinois might be
violative of full faith and credit under the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Hughes and First National6 3 The concurring opinion
was correct in noting that, although the majority had refused to
base their holding on forum non conveniens, this case presented
a factual situation in which dismissal could have been properly
justified on that basis, but was unconstitutional when based on
public policy.6
Unfortunately the Marchlik decision regarding the public
policy of Illinois has since been held by the Seventh Circuit not
60289 N.E.2d 799 (IM. 1968).
61 Id. at 800.
62 Id. at 803.
63 Id. (Ward, I., concurring).
64 Id. Although it is the author's position that the concept of public policy is
inappropriate in regard to access to a forum, it will subsequently be seen that the
doctrine of forum non conveniens is still available in deciding the question of
access.
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to be violative of full faith and credit in Reishus v. Maryland
Casualty Company,6" a suit brought in Illinois by Illinois residents
to recover for injuries sustained in an auto crash in Wisconsin.
The Seventh Circuit held that to allow a suit under the Wisconsin
direct action statute would be violative of the public policy of
Illinois as set forth in Marchlik.65 The court went into consider-
able detail to distinguish the case from Hughes and First National,
arguing that the key to those cases was discrimination and that
there could be no discrimination in this instance since the courts
of Illinois were closed to all direct action statutes, Illinois having
no direct action statute of its own.67 This distinction is not per-
suasive when one considers that there actually is discrimination
present in Reishus. It is quite true that the sort of discrimination
present in Hughes is not evident, since in Hughes both Illinois
and Wisconsin had wrongful death statutes and in Reishus only
Wisconsin had a direct action statute. In Hughes the discrimina-
tion was between statutes, whereas the discrimination in Reishus
is between a statute and the lack of a statute. The scheme of suit
provided for by Illinois is preferred over the scheme provided
for by Wisconsin. This preference is not implemented by applica-
tion of a choice of law rule to say that Illinois rather than Wiscon-
sin law is properly applicable, but rather the simple device of
denial of access to a forum. This seems to be very similar to the
discrimination encountered in both Hughes and First National,
and such denial of access is therefore violative of full faith and
credit. The only practical means of preventing such violation is
adherence to a rigid rule of access to a forum without reference
to its public policy. If the public policy of the forum is indeed
so strong and is offended, it will later be possible to choose to
apply forum law rather than the foreign rule, assuming that such
a choice is permissible within the constitutional restraint of due
process. This simply is not a decision to be made under the guise
of denial of a forum.
The issue of applicability of statutory ceilings on recovery
has occasionally been treated as involving the same principles
confronted in Hughes, First National and Broderick. Some courts
have used the concept of the public policy veto to deny applica-
65 411 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1969).
66 Id. at 778.
671d.
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tion of such statutory ceilings. In Hellrung v. Lafayette Loan &
Trust Co.,-" doubt was expressed about the constitutionality of a
refusal to apply the no-ceiling rule of a sister state in an Indiana
federal court. The states involved were Indiana, the forum state
which bad a $1000 ceiling on recovery in survival actions, and
Illinois, which had no ceiling on survival actions and whose
survival statute was the basis of the suit. The court in Hellrung
was able to avoid the constitutional issue by holding that the
Indiana ceiling was by the clear terms of its language applicable
only to suits brought under it, and therefore it was not applicable
to a suit based on the survival statute of a sister state.69 Dicta
in the decision suggests that the court would have, if the rejection
on the basis of construction had been impossible, held that ap-
plication of the Indiana ceiling was violative of full faith and
credit as outlined in Hughes and First National.70 This same
court was to note three years later in Zirkelbach v. Decatur Cart-
age Co.71 that any attempt to apply the Indiana limitation of
$15,000 on wrongful death actions to a wrongful death suit
brought under the Ohio wrongful death statute would violate
the requirements of full faith and credit.
72
The issue of application of statutory ceilings was faced by
the New York Court of Appeals in the famous case of Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc.7 3 in which the public policy of New York
was used to escape application of the $15,000 Massachusetts
limitation on wrongful death recovery. The suit in Kilberg was
brought for the death of a New York resident in an airplane
crash in Massachusetts. A New York constitutional provision
against such limitations74 led the court to hold that such ceilings
were contrary to the public policy of New York.75 A concurring
opinion in Kilberg indicated that application of the Massachusetts
ceiling was compelled by full faith and credit as construed in
Hughes,76 but this does not seem to be a contention which was
given any serious consideration by the majority of the court.
68 102 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Ind. 1951).
G Id. at 823.
70 Id.
71 119 F. Supp. 753 (N.D. Ind. 1954).
72Id. at 754.
73 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1961).
74 N.Y. CoNsTr. art. I § 16.
75 172 N.E.2d at 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
70 Id. at 535, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 146 (FrosseL, J., concurring).
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The possibility of a constitutional compulsion to apply statu-
tory ceilings was given much consideration and appears to have
been settled in Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.77 Pearson in-
volved a suit brought in a New York federal district court under
the Massachusetts wrongful death statute to recover for the
death of a New York resident in the same airplane crash in
Massachusetts. The trial court had held, as one might expect,
that application of the Massachusetts ceiling was contrary to the
public policy of New York as announced by the Court of Appeals
in Kilberg.78 The Second Circuit first held that failure to apply
the Massachusetts ceiling was violative of the full faith and credit
compulsion explained in Hughes.79 However, this holding was
reversed when the case was reheard by the Second Circuit
sitting en banc. 0 This decision is quite correct. The fact that
there is no constitutional obligation to enforce the statutory
ceiling of a sister state is in no manner inconsistent with the
thesis that there should be access to a forum regardless of the
public policy of the forum state. The results reached in both
Kilberg and Pearson were correct and serve as perfect examples
of the dichotomy between access and choice of law. Mr. Justice
Black was extremely careful in Hughes to say that in that situation
all that was required by full faith and credit was the provision
of a forum; his opinion clearly shows that the choice of law to
be applied is open once a forum has been provided."'
In all of the cases discussed above regarding the application
of a statutory ceiling, each state has done exactly what was con-
stitutionally required of it by full faith and credit as construed in
Hughes-i.e., providing a forum for the hearing of the claim.
If after having provided a forum a state then chooses to escape
from the sister state's ceiling on damages, this is constitutionally
permissible. In Pearson the Second Circuit was correct in saying
that full faith and credit did not compel application of the Massa-
chusetts ceiling. One might ask whether this is in reality the
striking of a defense on the grounds of public policy, an action
77 307 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1962).
78 Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 539, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
79 307 F.2d at 133.8D Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 556 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).81 Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 n.10 (1950).
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which the Restatement (Second) says is not permissible,8 2 and
is clearly forbidden by the holding of the Supreme Court in
Home Insurance Co. v. Dick8 3 unless the forum has some
substantial connection with the controversy. However, a ceil-
ing does not constitute a defense to liability, but rather is a
device for limiting the amount of such liability. In view of this,
it is quite permissible in circumstances of significant contacts
for a state to entertain a suit based on the statutes of a sister
state and then decide not to apply a portion of the statute of the
sister state which imposes a ceiling on recovery.
A very disturbing example of a public policy based refusal
to provide a forum is found in Hartness v. Aldens, Inc.,8 4 a sur-
vival action brought in an Illinois federal district court for in-
juries and suffering prior to the death of a South Carolina resident
pursuant to the South Carolina survival statute.85 The injury had
been caused by a faulty lawnmower in South Carolina. The man-
ufacturer of the lawnmower was an Indiana corporation, and the
lawnmower had been purchased by the South Carolina resident
through Aldens, an Illinois mail order corporation. The trial
court held that the action was barred by the public policy of
Illinois, since several state court decisions had not allowed sur-
vival actions.86 This decision was upheld by the Seventh Circuit
despite a claim that if such a policy barred this survival action,
it was violative of full faith and credit as construed in Hughes
and First National." The Seventh Circuit distinguished this from
a full faith and credit situation on the grounds that both Hughes
and First National involved discrimination against non-residents,
whereas Hartness involved no such discrimination since the
courts of Illinois were not open to survival actions by either
residents or non-residents. 8 This is merely another instance of
the failure of a court to recognize that the discrimination struck
down in Hughes and First National was discrimination against
laws, not against persons. Hartness was further distinguished
from a full faith and credit situation on the grounds that here
8 2 RESTATEMMNT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAws § 90, Comment a (1969).
83 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930).
84 801 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1962).
85 S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-209 (1962).
86 801 F.2d at 228.
87 Id. at 229-30.
88 Id. at 230.
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Illinois was not the only forum available to hear the suit. 9 It is
impossible to say how anyone could seriously accept this con-
tention when a statute based on exactly the same premise, i.e.,
availability of another forum, was struck down in First National.
If full faith and credit is to have the unifying effect on the
federal system which it was intended to have, it must at least
be strong enough to compel states to serve as forums despite
public policy to the contrary. The presence of a hostile public
policy is not strong enough to overcome full faith and credit.
The position taken here does not negate the concept of public
policy in the choice of law process, nor should it even imply that
there is no place for the public policy veto. In those jurisdictions
which adhere to the vested rights system of choice of law, the
public policy veto is an absolutely necessary tool for bringing
essential flexibility to the system. The nature of the federal
system allows states to have competing policies and for them to
prefer their policy to that of a sister state.90 The relevant question
is at what particular point in time those compelling policies are
to be allowed to operate. The contention here is that although
there is such a point, it is not that point at which the decision on
access to a forum is made. The decision to deny access is equally
objectionable whether made on the basis of a judicial determina-
tion of public policy or on the basis of a state statute clearly
setting forth the contrary state policy on the matter.91
Although the United States Supreme Court has not as yet
held that public policy cannot play a part in the determination of
access to a forum, indicative language in Hughes, First National,
Broderick, and most particularly in Angel v. Bullington,92 shows
89 Id.
90 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), and
Carrol v. Lanza 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
91 For a clear illustration of the effect of a statutory enactment of public
policy on access, see Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
92d. at 188-89. In that case a resident of Virginia sold land in Virginia to a
North Carolina resident. The total purchase price of the land was not paid, but
securty was given in the form of notes and a trust deed executed by the pur-
chaser. When the purchaser defaulted on the notes, the seller brought suit in a
state court in Virginia and the land in question was sold to cover the judgment.
The sale price of the land was not sufficient to pay the judgment, so the seller
then filed suit in a state court in North Carolina to recover the deficiency, which had
not been reduced to judgment in Virginia. A trial court decision in favor of allow-
ing suit was reversed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, Bullington v.
Angel, 16 S.E.2d 411 (N.C. 1941), on the grounds that such suit could not be
maintained in North Carolina due to a state statute forbidding suits to recover(Continued on next page)
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that this is a correct conclusion to draw. Although these cases
do not contain holdings which directly support this conclusion,
they do clearly restrict the application of public policy in the
area, and it is possible to logically conclude that public policy
should play no part in the question of access to a forum. For full
faith and credit to have the very strong position opted for in these
opinions, an absolute requirement of access is the only viable
rule, and, one might add, it is the simplest one to administer.
Yet the indications are clear that public policy has the position
in the federal system which has already been discussed-public
policy is useful as a choice of law rule. Certainly a state should
not be compelled to reach a result which is clearly contrary to its
public policy provided it has sufficient contact with the litigation
to constitutionally apply its public policy.
The implications in the above cases need to be put onto more
solid footing by the United States Supreme Court. The Court
should reiterate clearly the strong unifying principle of full faith
emphasized by Mr. Justice Black in Hughes v. Fetter,93 and
squarely hold that this principle of unity demands no less than
an absolute rule of access to a forum regardless of contrary
public policies. 4
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
deficiency judgments under these circumstances. This holding was made in the
face of a claim by the seller that full faith and credit obliged North Carolina to
provide a forum for this suit on the deficienty based on the laws of Virginia. The
decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina could have been reviewed in the
United States Supreme Court by appeal rather than by writ of certiorari. Instead
of taking this step, the seller filed suit on the same claim in a federal district court
in North Carolina and allowed his time for appeal to expire. This strange move
may be justified in part by the fact that the decision of the North Carolina Supreme
Court seemed to rest on procedural grounds, but this would only negate a resjudicata effect and would not overcome the Erie problem found in a suit in federal
court on the same claim. The seller prevailed at trial in the federal court Bulling-
ton v. Angel 56 F. Supp. 372 (W.D.N.C. 1944), and this result was airmed in
the Court of Appeals Angel v. Bullington 150 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1945). The
decision in favor of tle seller was reverse by the United States Supreme Court.
Although the case contained no holding of relevance to the issue of obligation to
provide a forum, had counsel appealed the adverse decision of the North Carolina
Supreme Court to the United States Supreme Court, it would have been the most
significant case in the area. The inference from the tone of the opinion in the
United States Supreme Court is that the decision of North Carolina denying
access would have been overturned as an unconstitutional denial of access.
93 341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951).
94 Itshould be recognized that when this rule of access is appl:ied to a vested
rights jurisdiction it will often be difficult to determine whether tere h as been a
denial of access or a choice of law, but this should not deter the formulation of
the rule. The reason for the added difficulty in a vested rights jurisdiction is that
t:e 'ituation in which a court has based its decision on a public policy veto of
the otherwise applicable law will look very much like the situation in which it(Continued on next page)
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Tim BAN AGAINST Surs BASED ON PENAL STATUTES
It has been an oft-stated principle of conflicts since the
Supreme Court decision in The Antelope"5 in 1825 that the courts
of one nation will not enforce the penal statutes of another
nation. The Antelope involved a controversy between an Amer-
ican captain of a privateer and the consuls of Spain and Portugal
over the right to possession of African slaves who had been cap-
tured when the privateer was seized by an American cutter. Of
course, The Antelope could not possibly determine the extent
that this premise concerning penal statutes is applicable within a
federal union. The position of the Restatement (First) on the
issue was that "[n]o action can be maintained to recover a penalty
the right to which is given by the law of another state,"9 and
this is a position followed by the Restatement (Second) which
provides that "[n]o action will be entertained on a foreign penal
cause of action."97 It is very difficult to predict just how the
Supreme Court will hold on this issue, but it is the contention
here that there are two possible holdings; the more desirable is
unlikely, and the other is the absolute minimum which can be
done in this area. The more desirable of the two would be an
absolute rule of access to a forum; the other would be at least a
federal test to control the definition of "penal".
Whether or not a state may refuse to enforce a judgment
rendered under the penal statutes of another state is subject to
some doubt. The Supreme Court held quite clearly in Huntington
v. Attrill9 that the courts of Maryland were obliged by full faith
and credit to enforce a judgment rendered in New York under
a New York statute providing for personal liability of a corporate
director who participated in the submission of a false certificate
Footnote continued from precedingfpage)
has denied access on grounds of public policy. In both cases the losing party will
have lost on the basis of the public policy of the forum. In a jurisdiction which
uses the interest analysis it should be a good deal easier to determine whether a
suitor has lost on the merits or merely been denied access to a forum since the
interest analysis (at least in theory) articulates more clearly the reasons for a
decision. The vested rights problem was present in Hughes, but the Court had
no difficulty in correctly determining that access had been denied. Given the
duty of the Court to supervise the full faith and credit command, difficulty in
application should not be a factor of any concern. Only an absolute rule of access
regardless of public policy will satisfy the unifying principle of full faith and
credit.
9523 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).9 6 RESTATEmENT (FIsT) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 611 (1934).
97 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICTS OF LA-s § 89 (1969).
98 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
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for incorporation. It is unfortunate that the facts did not present
the issue of full faith and credit to judgments based on penal
laws, since the Court concluded that the New York statute was
not penal in nature. However, since full faith and credit was
involved, the determination of whether or not the statute was
penal was one to be made by a federal standard.100 The test for
whether or not a statute was penal in nature was ". . . whether
the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public, or a
wrong to the individual .... "10 1 Although the decision in Hunting-
ton seems to have been based on the assumption that had the
judgment been based on a statute properly classified as penal it
would not have been entitled to full faith and credit, it is im-
portant to note that the issue was not directly confronted.
Indeed the precise issue of whether or not a judgment based
on a penal statute is entitled to full faith and credit has never
been ruled upon by the United States Supreme Court. The class
of judgments not entitled to full faith and credit is very nar-
row, and the Court has even required recognition of judg-
ments involving gambling and clear errors of law. 02  It is
quite possible that if the issue were now faced by the Court, the
concept of full faith and credit would be held to apply even to
judgments based on penal laws. If the Court were willing to
extend the full faith and credit protection to penal judgments, it
would probably limit that protection to those judgments involving
only monetary sanctions. It hardly seems within the realm of
possibility that it would be held that one state must execute
persons sentenced to death in another state or even to imprison
persons given sentences in other states. However, there should
be no problem with extending the protection to monetary judg-
ments based on penal statutes.
If the Supreme Court would hold that judgments based on
penal statutes are entitled to full faith and credit, one could then
ask why there should not also be full access to a forum to sue on
a claim based on a penal statute but not yet reduced to judgment.
If the Court were willing to so hold in regard to penal statutes,
again it would almost certainly want to limit the class of penal
09 Id. at 686.
100 Id. at 666.
101 Id. at 668.
10 2 Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 280 (1908).
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statutes so treated to those involving only monetary sanctions.
The question then is whether or not full faith is strong enough
to compel a state to enforce the penal laws of another state which
impose fines as sanctions. As indicated in previous discussion, the
full faith and credit command does not distinguish between
judgments and statutes. Full faith should certainly be held to be
strong enough to compel a state to open the doors of its courts
to suits based on the penal statutes of a sister state.
The prejudice against penal statutes probably has its roots
in the idea of legislative jurisdiction. The idea that the laws of a
state have no effect outside its territorial boundaries may have
some validity when one is concerned with sovereign nations, but
it is not a concept which should be absolute in a federal union.
Subject to constitutional limitations, the laws of one state often
can have effect outside that state. Legislative jurisdiction has
certainly been a die-hard concept, but a holding of a constitutional
right to access to sue on a penal statute would do much to
eradicate it. An absolute rule of access for suit on penal statutes
is the more desirable of the two available alternatives, but it is
unlikely to be implemented. Such a rule depends on a favorable
ruling in regard to judgments and an extension of that rule to
include statutes. Although the first is a possibility, the odds
against both happening are high. In view of that reality, a rule
should be formulated to minimize the damage of not going as
far as is desirable.
The alternative to an absolute rule of access is a rule which
would deny access to suits based on penal statutes but which
would make the determination of whether or not a statute is
penal specified by federal law. This is a rule which seems quite
possible in view of the decision in Hughes. Would the result
in that case have been any different had the denial of access
been based on a finding that the Illinois wrongful death statute
was penal in nature? Could Wisconsin have escaped its obligation
to provide a forum by the simple device of using a penal classifica-
tion instead of a public policy denial? Both questions must
clearly be answered in the negative. The denial of a forum would
still have been violative of full faith and credit because the
Illinois wrongful death statute was not penal in nature. The
implication is that the question of whether or not a statute is
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penal is a question to be determined according to a federal test
since an error in classification would be violative of full faith
and credit. Application of the Huntington standard to the ques-
tion of access for statutes will surely preclude access to statutes
requiring either execution or incarceration as a penalty and will
preclude suits on most statutes involving fines.
Although there is dicta in Texas & Pacific Railway v. Cox'03
to suggest that a state need not serve as a forum for suits based
on the penal statutes of sister states, the case may stand for the
idea that the determination of whether or not a statute is penal
is to be made according to a federal standard. Suit had been
brought in a federal court in Texas to recover for the wrongful
death of a Texas resident which had occurred in Louisiana. The
Texas administratrix brought suit under the Louisiana wrongful
death statute against the railroad's receivers who had been ap-
pointed in Louisiana. The Court found that the Louisiana wrong-
ful death statute was not penal in nature because its intent was
to compensate for a wrong to an individual rather than for a
wrong to the public.104 Since Texas & Pacific was decided the
same year as Huntington, and the two involve similar tests for
determining whether or not a statute is penal in nature, the in-
ference may be drawn that this is a determination to be made in
either case according to a federal standard. This is admittedly
contrary to some unfortunate dicta in Huntington which indicates
that when suit is brought on a statute, rather than to enforce a
judgment based on the statute, the state is free to determine for
itself whether or not the statute is penal.10 5 Since an erroneous
classification of a statute as penal would be violative of full faith
and credit, it seems obvious that the ultimate supervision in this
area must be on the basis of a federal test. There would be little
point in allowing each state to have its own test when the final
judgment will be based on a federal standard.106
The first instance of application of the Huntington test to a
suit brought directly on a statute rather than to enforce a judg-
ment is James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry.10 7 The
103 145 U.S. 593 (1892).
104 Id. at 605.
105 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 683 (1892).
100 For an example of the correct application of a standard similar to the
federal test for penal statutes, see Kennealy v. State, 51 A. 475 (N.J. 1902).
107 273 U.S. 119 (1927).
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suit was filed by an Illinois resident against a Texas resident and
a Missouri corporation. A portion of the liability asserted by the
plaintiff was based on a Texas statute imposing exemplary
damages on a person who made false representations in a real
estate or stock purchase transaction. Application of this statute
was resisted on grounds that it was penal. The United States
Supreme Court rejected this contention on the ground that the
statute was not penal according to the Huntington test,0 s thus
refuting the dicta in Huntington that a state may make an inde-
pendent determination of the issue when suit is on the statute
itself rather than to enforce a judgment. James-Dickinson signi-
fies that whenever the statute of a sister state is resisted on grounds
that it is penal, classification is to be made on the basis of the
Huntington test. It should not matter that a suit is brought in
state court rather than in federal court based on diversity as in
James-Dickinson. Since an error in classification is violative of
full faith, the test for such classification must be federal.
The classic example of a violation of the federal test for
penal statutes is found in Doggrell v. Southern Box Co.109 This
involved a suit brought in federal court in Tennessee, the domicile
of two of the would-be incorporators, by a seller of goods against
persons who had attempted to form a corporation under Arkansas
law. Another would-be incorporator was domiciled in Arkansas.
The basis for the suit against the incorporators personally was an
Arkansas statute which provided that incorporators would be
liable as partners for debts incurred after a faulty attempt at
incorporation. The attempt at incorporation in this case was
faulty because the incorporators had failed to comply with an
Arkansas statute requiring the articles of incorporation to be
filed with the county clerk of the county in which the corporation
had its principal place of business. The trial court had found for
the plaintiff, and this holding was initially affirmed by the Sixth
Circuit, which held that the Arkansas statute was not penal and
therefore could be enforced in Tennessee. 110 Unfortunately Dog-
grell did not end with this correct result because the Sixth Circuit
was petitioned for a rehearing by the defendants, and while this
108 Id. at 126.
109 208 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1953).
110 Doggrell v. Great Southern Box Co., 206 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1953).
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petition was pending the issue of the status of the Arkansas
statute was faced by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Paper
Products Co. v. Doggrell."' In Paper Products the Tennessee
court applied the Huntington test for penal statutes, and con-
cluded that the Arkansas statute was penal in nature, and would
not be enforced in Tennessee.1 2 The Sixth Circuit on rehearing
held that it was bound by the determination of the Tennessee
court that the statute was penal and therefore the Arkansas
statute would not be enforced in a federal court in Tennessee."'
The original determination of the Sixth Circuit was undoubt-
edly correct. judge Martin, dissenting in the second opinion,
accurately noted that the Huntington test for penal statutes was
binding on both the state and federal courts because an incorrect
classification would deny full faith and credit to the Arkansas
statute. Since the test was federal in origin, the Sixth Circuit
could not be foreclosed from making its own determination by
any decision rendered in the Tennessee state courts." 4 Under the
Huntington test, the Arkansas statute was not penal because the
compensation was for a wrong to an individual, not a wrong to
the public, and the recovery for the wrong was to go to an indi-
vidual. Even if there is room within our federal system for one
state to refuse to enforce the penal statutes of sister states, this
is clearly an issue which must be controlled by a federal standard
if full faith and credit is to have any meaning at all." 5
A fairly recent correct application of the Huntington test for
penal statutes is found in Texaco, Inc. v. Vanden Bosche."6 In
that case suit was brought in a state court in Maryland on the
basis of a Virginia statute which imposed personal liability upon
the directors, officers and agents of foreign corporations for con-
tracts made or torts committed within Virginia prior to the corpo-
ration having secured a certificate of authority to transact business
in Virginia."17 The case is not as strong as it might be since the
Supreme Court of Maryland found that the plaintiff had failed
111261 S.W.2d 127 (Tenn. 1953).
112 Id. at 181.
"3 208 F.2d at 311.
114 Id. at 312 (Martin, J., dissenting).
115 For another example of an erroneous classification of a statute as penal,
see Tobin v. McGrath 103 A.2d 795 (R.I. 1954).
116 219 A.2d 80 (Md. 1966).1 17 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-119 (1973).
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to state a claim arising under the Virginia statute."' Nevertheless,
there is some very interesting language in the case concerning
the status of the Virginia statute. The Maryland Supreme Court
assumed that the courts of Maryland must be open to suits based
on the statutes of sister states unless such statutes came within
the Huntington definition of penal."9 Of even more interest is
the fact that the court further noted that absent such penal
classification or a proper case for forum non conveniens, the courts
of Maryland would be obliged by full faith and credit as outlined
in Hughes and First National to be open to such suit. 2 ° This
seems to support an absolute rule of access regardless of the
public policy of the forum. Texaco provides a clear example of
a court which has correctly recognized that the question of access
to a forum is one of constitutional dimension, that the test for
denial on the basis of a penal statute is a federal one, and that
failure to apply that test or error in application would be violative
of full faith and credit.121
A diflicult area which is included within the ban against penal
statutes but which in reality involves its own separate problems
is that of access to a forum for suit based on the revenue laws of
a sister state. The Restatement (First) provided that "[n]o action
can be maintained on a right created by the law of a foreign state
as a method of furthering its own governmental interests,"' 2 2 but
the Restatement (Second) has been quite careful to take no posi-
tion at all on this issue.12 3 The question to be faced is whether or
not this discrimination against revenue laws, well settled in choice
of law problems between sovereign nations, is applicable to sister
states within a federal union. Although there may be justification
for the position that, in the absence of a treaty provision to the
contrary, one nation may refuse to enforce the revenue laws of
another nation, this is a position which should not be allowed in
a federal union bound by the unifying principle of full faith and
credit.
118 219 A.2d at 82.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 83, 84.
121 It might be added that, although not called for in the decision in Texaco,
the Virginia statute in question would not be penal under the Huntington test.
The plaintiff was constitutionally entitled to a forum and had he been able to
state a valid claim he would have prevailed.
122 REsTATEImNT (FrsT) OF CoNmicts OF LAWS § 610 (1934).12 3 IESTATEmNT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 89, Comment c (1969).
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Strangely, the problem of access to a revenue statute of a
sister state seems not to have arisen in the United States until
1911 in the case of Maryland v. Turner.12  This involved an action
brought by the state of Maryland in a New York court to recover
for personal property taxes levied on the defendant while he was
a resident of Maryland. The New York Court of Appeals noted
that this was the first instance it could find of a suit being sought
on the basis of revenue statutes of a sister state. 25 The court
equated the issue of access in this case to that of access to penal
statutes, and concluded that under the Huntington test the Mary-
land revenue statute was penal and hence need not be enforced
in New York.126
Despite this inauspicious beginning, there has been a great
deal of recent case law to indicate that a state should provide
a forum for suit based on the taxing statutes of sister states. The
Supreme Court of Illinois held in City of Detroit v. Gould 27
that the Michigan city could sue in Illinois to recover from the
defendant's personal property taxes not previously reduced to
judgment.' 28 This suit had been dismissed by the Illinois trial
court despite an argument that full faith and credit compelled
access for such suit. The Illinois Supreme Court reserved decision
on the full faith and credit claim,129 but concluded that the
modem view was not to treat revenue statutes as penal.1
3 0 If
such statutes are not penal in nature, then full faith and credit
clearly compels access to a forum.' 31
The relationship between taxing statutes and penal statutes
is well illustrated in Nelson v. Minnesota Income Tax Divison
3 2
In that case suit was brought in Wyoming to collect Minnesota
income taxes which had become due in the period of time which
the Wyoming defendant had resided in Minnesota. The Supreme
Court of Wyoming allowed the suit to recover the amount of tax
124 132 N.Y.S. 173 (1911).
125 Id. at 174.
126 Id.
127 146 N.E.2d 61 (II. 1957).
128 Id. at 65.
120 Id.
130 Id. at 63.
'31A similar conclusion that the modem view is against classifying revenue
statutes as penal led to the allowance of suit by the state of Utah in Nevada on
a claim concerning state income taxes. State Tax Comm'n of Utah v. Cord, 404
P.2d 422 (Nev. 1965).
132 429 P.2d 324 (Wyo. 1967).
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due, but refused to allow Minnesota to recover a penalty called
for by the tax statute. 3  It is possible then to adhere to the idea
that one state does not enforce the penal statutes of another state
and still allow suit based on portions of the revenue laws of
sister states.
The question which must be considered is whether revenue
statutes are penal under the Huntington test. 34 Ohio Department
of Taxation v. Kleitch Bros., Inc.,35 contains dicta implying that
revenue statutes are not penal. The issue in that case did not
involve suit based on the taxing statutes of a sister state, because
the suit was brought in Michigan to collect on three tax judg-
ments previously rendered against the defendants in Ohio.136
There can be no doubt that judgments based on the tax laws of
a sister state are entitled to full faith and credit."'7 The Michigan
court in Kleitch noted that even if these taxes had not been
reduced to judgment, full faith and credit would still require
Michigan to allow the suit to collect on the taxes incurred by
these defendants. 88 The feeling of the Michigan Supreme Court
was that since Michigan obviously had no public policy against
the collection of taxes (indeed we might ask what state would
have such a policy), the unifying principles of full faith and
credit enunciated in Hughes would compel the provision of a
forum."39 Although this language is dicta, it is illustrative of the
proper determination of the problem.
Most taxing statutes will not fit within the definition of penal
in Huntington because taxes are not assessed to redress for wrongs
either to individuals or to the public. A tax in a fee which a
person must pay for services which he has received from the state.
A portion of a tax statute may be penal, but this is no reason for
a denial of access to a suit based on other sections. As indicated
in Nelson, the correct way to handle such a situation is to enter-
tain suit for the collection of taxes but refuse to enforce the
penalty.140 Since revenue statutes are not penal within the federal
'13 Id. at 325.
134 See text accompanying note 98 supra.
135 98 N.W.2d 636 (Mich. 1959).
136 Id. at 638.
L37 Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
138 98 N.W.2d at 643.
13 Id.
140 429 P.2d 324, 325 (Wyo. 1967).
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definition, a denial of access to a forum would be violative of
full faith and credit under the Hughes reasoning. Surely since
tax judgments are entitled to full faith and credit, it is not asking
too much of the unifying principle to compel access to a forum
for suits on revenue statutes.
Unfortunately, some states still refuse to allow suits based
upon the revenue statutes of sister states. For example, the courts
of Texas have followed the traditional rule of no access for such
suits, as evidenced by their refusal in Hamm v. Berrey'41 to allow
Alabama to bring suit against Texas residents in a Texas court
for failure to file a non-resident income tax return. However,
the problem may not be too serious since a properly drafted long
arm statute would allow a state to reach persons liable for taxes.
The long arm statute could be used to procure a valid judgment,
then the state could simply sue to collect the judgment, a tactic
which would be successful since such judgments are entitled to
full faith and credit. The problem has also been alleviated by
the execution of agreements between some states to enforce tax
claims on a reciprocal basis. Neither of these alternatives would
be necessary if the Supreme Court of the United States would
clearly hold that suits based on revenue statutes must be given
access because of the constitutional demand of full faith and
credit.
An absolute rule of access to penal statutes could of course
settle the issue of whether or not the revenue statutes of sister
states can be denied access to a forum. Even if the penal bar is
upheld, this should not be allowed to act as an absolute bar
to suits based on revenue statutes. The very least which should
be done is to compel the question of access to hinge on whether
or not an individual revenue statute is penal as defined in Hunt-
ington. Further, penal portions of revenue statutes should be
separable from non-penal sections, so that the latter can be en-
forced even if the former cannot. It is probable that when
measured against the Huntington test most revenue statutes will
not be penal since they are assessed for services rendered rather
than compensation for wrongdoing. In no event should the ques-
tion of access to suits on revenue statutes be allowed to be made
141419 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
KENTUCKY Lw Jou[NAL
under state law. Here, as in the other areas closely tied to full
faith and credit, only a federal test will suffice. The unifying
principle of full faith and credit cannot exist with less.
FORUM NON CONvFNmNs As A BAR To AccEss
Although it is clearly necessary that a forum have adjudicatory
authority before proceeding to determine the merits of litigation,
it has long been recognized that there might be some circum-
stances in which the forum might decline to exercise its ad-
judicatory authority. The ideas of public policy and non-enforce-
ment of penal laws previously discussed are two of the devices
used to justify this refusal. In addition, it has been thought that
matters solely related to convenience and economy could justify
a refusal to serve as a forum. The core concept of this doctrine
of forum non conveniens has been well outlined in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflicts, which provides that "[a] state will
not exercise jurisdiction if it is a seriously inconvenient forum
for the trial of the action provided that a more appropriate forum
is available to the plaintiff."142
Although forum non conveniens seems to have no further
applicability in the federal courts since the enactment of a transfer
provision, 14 there is still quite clearly a close relationship between
the doctrine and the holding in Hughes v. Fetter. The relationship
is obvious if one will only ask whether or not the result in Hughes
would have been any different had the basis of the Wisconsin
holding been forum non conveniens rather than public policy.
Since the Supreme Court indicated in dicta in Hughes that this
was not an appropriate case for the use of forum non conveniens,14
the answer is that it probably would not have changed the out-
come. A mere change in the wording of the Wisconsin decision
could not negate a constitutional duty if this was indeed not an
appropriate place for the use of the doctrine. It might be added
that, as will be seen infra, Hughes was not such a case because
all relevant parties connected with the action were Wisconsin
residents. Indeed under interest analysis there would seem to
be little doubt that Wisconsin law was properly applied to govern
14 2 RESTATEMMNT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAws § 84 (1969).
14328 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970).
144 Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613 (1951).
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the wrongful death suit in Hughes. Since the result in Hughes
would have been the same had the basis of the Wisconsin de-
cision been forum non conveniens, this apparently means that
the dimensions of the doctrine are constitutionally determined
by full faith and credit. In addition to the implication in
Hughes that forum non conveniens is a constitutionally vital
doctrine, there are similar indications in other cases. 145
Given the fact that the doctrine is constitutionally viable, the
question remains as to its dimensions. Since an erroneous applica-
tion would be violative of full faith and credit, based on the fact
that Hughes would have been unaltered by the basis of the state
court decision being forum non conveniens, the test for application
of the doctrine must be federal in nature. Surely the protection
of full faith and credit cannot be left up to the states.
The scope of the doctrine of forum non conveniens as de-
termined according to federal standards is best illustrated by the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corpora-
tion v. Gilbert.140 Gulf Oil was a diversity action, brought by a
Virginia resident against a Pennsylvania corporation doing busi-
ness in both Virginia and New York, in a federal trial court in the
Southern District of New York. The basis of the claim was the
allegation that the defendant was negligent in the delivery of
gasoline to the warehouse of the plaintiff. It was alleged that this
negligence caused a fire which damaged plaintiff's Virginia ware-
house as well as property placed in the care of the plaintiff by
his customers. 47 The Supreme Court of the United States found
that the doctrine of forum non conveniens was available for use
in the federal courts148 and outlined quite clearly the factors
which were to be considered in deciding whether or not to
exercise the doctrine. It is quite important to note that the Court
indicated that any application of the doctrine was based on the
assumption that there existed at least two forums in which the
defendant was amenable to suit.14 The other considerations in-
volved were set forth by the Court as follows:
145 E.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 345 n.6(1951).
14630 U.S. 501 (1947).
147 Id. at 502-03.
148 Id. at 505.
149 Id. at 507.
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Important considerations are the relative ease of access to
sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for at-
tendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of
willing, witnesses; possibility of view of the premises, if a view
would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inex-
pensive. There may also be questions as to the enforcibility of
a judgment if one is obtained....
Factors of public interest also have place in the doctrine.
Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is
piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its
origin.... There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial
of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law
that must govern the case, rather than having a court in some
other forum untangle problems in conflicts of laws, and in law
foreign to itself.150
From the facts in Gulf Oil the Court concluded that the trial
court had not abused its discretion in finding that New York was
not the most convenient forum for the trial of the action.' 5 '
The most important factor in application of the doctrine is the
assumption that if a dismissal is secured on this basis the plaintiff
will be able to bring his action in another forum. This is an
assumption explicitly included in the Restatement (Second) of
Conflicts, 5 2 and is a condition which is constitutionally required
as well. That the result in Hughes would not have differed
had the basis of the decision in the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
been forum non conveniens rather than public policy shows that
an erroneous application of the doctrine may be violative of full
faith and credit. The assumption of the Court in Gulf Oil that
there should be more than one forum available before the doctrine
is applied, when coupled with the constitutional mandate of
Hughes, indicates that a dismissal on the basis of forum non
conveniens when no other forum is available would be violative
of full faith and credit.
Although there is no question that forum non conveniens can-
not be constitutionally applied when there is no other forum avail-
able, the other relevant considerations in the application of the
150 Id. at 508-09.
'51 Id. at 512.
lS2 BXsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CoN -ICTs OF LAWS § 84 (1969).
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doctrine are much more difficult to regulate under the full faith
and credit provisions. As noted previously in Gulf Oil, access to
proof, ability to secure appearance of witnesses, cost of securing
evidence, availability of a view, enforceability of judgments, and
conditions of court dockets are all relevant factors to be con-
sidered. 3 The interrelationship of these criteria in deciding
whether or not to apply forum non conveniens is governed by
full faith and credit, but the degree of that control is uncertain.
As noted supra, the boundaries of the doctrine must be con-
trolled by a federal test, because errors in application of the doc-
trine are violative of full faith and credit. The problem is that
the area is one in which concrete dimensions cannot be form-
ulated. It would be undesirable for the full faith and credit
restraints to govern this area with great strictness. Since all these
factors would be extremely difficult to judge at the appellate
level, the area would seem to be one which should be left within
the discretion of the trial judge. However, the Supreme Court
should make it understood that this is an area of federal control
and federal standards, and that decisions are to be made within
constitutional guidelines. Such decisions, although discretionary,
will be subject to review for abuse of federal requirements. There
will be instances in which forum non conveniens will be used
simply to implement a local bias against serving as a forum. Such
bias must be prevented if the unifying theory of full faith and
credit is not to be subverted.
A ready example of an abuse of discretion in the administra-
tion of forum non conveniens would be the case of Hughes v.
Fetter n4 had the basis of that decision in the Wisconsin Supreme
Court been forum non conveniens instead of public policy. The
decedent, the administrator of the Hughes estate, the driver
of the auto in which Hughes was a passenger at the time of death,
and the insurer of the auto in which he was a passenger were all
residents of Wisconsin. The only factual connection of Illinois
with the suit was that Illinois was the place of the one-car ac-
cident which caused the death of Hughes. Though there was
some doubt about the possibility of suit against the insurer in
Illinois, there was definite availability of a forum in Illinois for
153 See text accompanying note 150 supra.
154 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
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a suit against the driver of the auto. The assumption of avail-
ability of another forum would not bar application of forum non
conveniens to these facts. Despite this, any application of the
doctrine to these facts would have been violative of full faith
and credit, because the connection of Wisconsin with the action
was so substantial that there was no room for discretion in making
the decision to exercise adjudicatory authority in Wisconsin. Any
decision to the contrary by the Wisconsin courts would have
denied full faith and credit to the Illinois wrongful death statute.
Numerous examples of the proper exercise of this discretionary
function are available. In Flaiz v. Moore,55 a Texas court held
that the doctrine precluded the hearing in Texas of a suit by a
Maryland resident against residents of Arkansas and Oklahoma
for injuries sustained in an auto crash in South Dakota.15 6 Suit
had been commenced against the Arkansas resident while he was
temporarily in Texas and against the Oklahoma resident as pro-
vided for by a statute pertaining to service on non-residents. The
Texas court noted that in this case Hughes did not oblige Texas
to serve as a forum, since in Hughes all parties were residents of
Wisconsin, whereas none of the parties in Flaiz were Texas
residents. 157 The Texas court was correct in noting that this was
a classic case for the application of forum non conveniens. A
similar result was reached by the Supreme Court of Illinois in
lames v. Grand Trunk Western Railway,15 in which it was said
that Illinois need not serve as a forum for a suit under the
Michigan wrongful death statute for the death of a Michigan
resident which had occurred in Michigan.'59 Although this was
dicta since no dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens
had been sought by the defendant, it does not alter the fact that
the factual situation here was such that dismissal on those
grounds would have been constitutionally permissible.
The consideration of forum non conveniens outlined above is
applicable only to the doctrine as used in state courts; however,
this limitation does not alter the fact that the test for application
155 358 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).156 Id. at 77.
157 Id. at 75.
158 152 N.E.2d 858 (IM.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 915 (1958).
159 Id. at 862.
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of the concept is federal. It should be noted that the general
rule of inapplicability of forum non conveniens in the federal
courts'00 applies only when transfer is available to another federal
forum. The doctrine is still appropriate in those rare instances,
such as Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. Eaton Co.,' 6 where the only
other available forum is a foreign nation.Y2
It is, as has been done supra, possible to outline to some
extent the constitutional dimensions of situations in which a
state is forbidden to deny access to a forum on the basis of forum
non conveniens. The question left open earlier was whether or
not there existed a similar constitutional compulsion to apply
the doctrine to forbid access in some situations. The decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Home Insurance Co. v. Dick6 3
indicates that when a forum lacks a substantial connection with
a controversy, it is forbidden by due process to apply its sub-
stantive law to the litigation. 4 When such an instance of lack
of substantial connection involves a sister state rather than a
foreign nation such as was involved in Home Insurance, the bar
against application of substantive law comes from full faith and
credit rather than due process. This is a distinction well illustrated
by John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates.'65 Despite
their obvious importance, neither of these cases provides any
insight into the question of whether or not the appropriate con-
stitutional provision (due process or full faith and credit) compels
the application of forum non conveniens in some fact situations.
In both Home Insurance and John Hancock, the states of Texas
and Georgia were allowed to serve as forums despite the lack
of a connection substantial enough to warrant application of their
substantive law. The two cases may by implication stand for the
'60 See note 143 supra.
3.6 234 F.2d 633, 646 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956), rehearing
denied, 352 U.S. 913 (1956).
'
0 2 For a discussion of the demise of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in
the federal system, see Collins v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 416 (2dCir.), appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 (1956). Whether or not the doctrine offorum non conveniens has been codified by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) for the federal
system is not such a simple question as might first appear, see, e.g., Hoffman v.
Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 364 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), and National
Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 327 (1964) (Black, J., dis-
senting).
163 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
104 Id. at 410.
105 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
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proposition that there is nothing in the constitutional provisions
of full faith and credit or due process which will prevent a state
from serving as a forum provided that it is willing to apply the
substantive law of a jurisdiction which has the necessary minimum
connection with the controversy.
Although there seems to be no constitutional compulsion to
apply forum non conveniens arising from either full faith and
credit or due process, such a compulsion may come under very
limited factual instances from the interstate commerce clause. In
Davis v. Farmers Co-Operative Equity Co., 6 the Supreme
Court held that in some circumstances the maintenance of
a suit might be an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce. 167 This case involved a suit brought by one Kansas
resident against another Kansas resident in a Minnesota state
court. The defendant did not own or operate any business in
Minnesota, but it did have an agent in Minnesota for the
solicitation of business. The claim sued upon involved damage
to a quantity of grain while it was being shipped from one point
in Kansas to another point in Kansas. Assuming that it is per-
missible to sue a corporation having minimum contacts with a
jurisdiction on a claim not arising from those minimum contacts,
there would seem to be no problem with getting jurisdiction over
the Kansas resident in Minnesota under modem theories of long
arm jurisdiction. The holding of the Supreme Court against the
maintenance of suit was not based on jurisdictional grounds, so
the above assumptions would appear to be correct.
Since Davis involved a situation in which forum non con-
veniens certainly could have been invoked to deny access to a
forum, the Supreme Court may by inference be saying that a
constitutional duty exists to use the doctrine in order to prevent
an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. This impli-
cation is as close as the Court has ever come to holding that, in
addition to the constitutional bar against the use of forum non
conveniens in some situations, there is also in some situations a
constitutional compulsion to apply the doctrine.
The narrowness of Davis can be seen from the subsequent
treatment of the area by the lower federal courts. The First
166 262 U.S. 312 (1928).
167 Id. at 815.
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Circuit distinguished Davis from Canadian Pacific Railway v.
Sullivan'0 8 on the grounds that in Sullivan the plaintiff was a
resident of the forum, a fact not present in Davis. 69 The suit was
for personal injuries and wrongful death which had occurred in
Canada, and the central issue was whether a Massachusetts
statute requiring foreign corporations to give written appoint-
ment of the Corporations Commissioner of Massachusetts as agent
for service of process could be applied to claims arising outside
Massachusetts without violating the interstate commerce pro-
visions of the federal Constitution.'Y The First Circuit replied
that such application was constitutional since the plaintiff was a
resident of the forum..7  Although the doctrine of forum non
conveniens could probably have been applied under the con-
stitutional guidelines set out above, there was no constitutional
compulsion to apply the doctrine.
A similar distinction can be seen in Scanapico v. Richmond,
Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad.17 2 There, in addition to
the plaintiff being a forum resident, there was a much more sub-
stantial connection between the railroad and the forum than
was present in the single-agent-for-solicitation-of-business situation
found in Davis. Similar considerations were identified but not
relied upon in Pillsbury Co. v. Southern Railway' 7 3
From these cases it could be concluded that there may be
instances in which a state will be precluded from serving as a
forum, but the limitation seems to be restricted to the very narrow
set of circumstances in which the state seeldng to serve as a
forum has virtually no connection with the litigation and, more
importantly, to circumstances which involve interstate commerce.
The reason for the narrowness of these cases is the fact that the
constitutional limitation comes not from due process or full faith
and credit, but from the interstate commerce clause. In cases
not involving interstate commerce, and in some cases involving
such commerce, a state is free to serve as a forum so long as it
has sufficient contacts for jurisdiction. Such a state may apply its
own substantive law provided it has sufficient connection with
168 126 F.2d 433 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 696 (1942).
16 Id. at 438-39.
170 Id. at 436.
171 Id. at 438.
172439 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1970).
173 836 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Minn. 1972).
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the litigation to do so without violating the requirements of
Home Insurance Co. v. Dick.1 4 A state can always serve as a
forum for cases not concerned with interstate commerce so long
as it does not unconstitutionally apply its substantive law. In
regard to interstate commerce, there is a middle ground between
the point at which it cannot serve as a forum. Instances of in-
ability to serve as a forum should be severely limited, as has been
done by the cases subsequent to Davis. In a federal union the
basic assumption should be in favor of access to any forum and
exceptions to this should be made sparingly.
There are some very definite conclusions which can be drawn
in regard to the use of forum non conveniens at this time. It is
clear that the doctrine still exists and is available for use in the
state court systems. The dimensions of the doctrine are to be
determined by a federal test since an erroneous application of
forum non conveniens, like erroneous applications of public policy
and penal classifications, so as to deny access to a forum, would
be violative of full faith and credit. Lack of such a federal test
to control the area would leave the states free to defeat the con-
stitutional mandate of full faith and credit. Access to a forum
should never be denied on the basis of forum non conveniens
when no other forum is available to the plaintiff. Beyond this
very basic point of availability of an alternate forum, application
of the doctrine should be based on considerations of fairness,
convenience, and judicial economy. Although this will be a dis-
cretionary decision on the part of the trial judge, it is not one which
can be free from review in higher courts. It should never be
forgotten that this is a decision based on a federal standard and
subject to ultimate review by the United States Supreme Court.
These considerations apply to determine whether a court
may refuse to serve as a forum. It has no application in the
federal courts in view of transfer availability. There may be cir-
cumstances in which a state will be precluded from serving as
a forum but these should be very limited. If a state wishes to
serve as a forum to hear a case in which it cannot constitutionally
apply its substantive law, it should be free to do so unless this
would be an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. Such
174 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
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impairment will arise only when a state has virtually no con-
nection with the litigation. Aside from this very limited circum-
stance, the spirit of full faith and credit requires access.
THE FUTURE OF T=E AREA
The interaction of the demands of full faith and credit with
the concepts of public policy, penal statutes, and forum non con-
veniens is one of very great importance to our federal system.
Although the broad scope of these three concepts may have some
validity in deciding whether or not to allow access to suits based
on the laws of foreign nations, such sweeping application is out
of place in a federal union. If a federal union is to function in an
effective manner, the broad dimensions of all three of these doc-
trines must bow to some degree to the constitutional mandate
of full faith and credit.
The principle that the concept of public policy functions
within a framework prescribed by full faith and credit was estab-
lished by Hughes v. Fetter,175 First National Bank of Chicago v.
United Air Lines176 and Broderick v. Rosner.177 These cases
imply that the constitutional framework also governs the work-
ings of the bar of access to penal statutes and the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. It may be concluded from these cases
that an erroneous application of any of these concepts so as to
deny access to a forum would be a denial of full faith and credit.
In view of this constitutional dimension, it would appear that the
precise limits of each of these three ideas are to be determined
according to a federal test. To allow the individual states to
develop tests for each of these concepts is to allow the fox to
guard the henhouse.
The purpose of this paper has been to outline the dimensions
of the doctrines and to suggest both the possible and probable
ways in which the United States Supreme Court could deal with
these issues. It is acknowledged that a great deal of this is con-
jecture due to a lack of precedent in the area. It is possible that
the trends noted in some lower courts will not be adopted when
the Supreme Court confronts the issues. Although a feeling of
175 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
176 342 U.S. 396 (1952).
177 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
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personal discomfort with the recent appointees to the Supreme
Court might lead one to conclude that there is little hope for
substantial work being done in the area, this is probably an unfair
reaction. It was, after all, the Warren Court which dodged these
issues for most of these last twenty years, and no one would deny
that the present Court is far removed from the Warren era. It
would seem, however, that the present Court is well on its way
to making a reputation for itself. It is possible that the reputation
of this Court could be made by its ability to deal with the tech-
nical aspects of the law which were ignored during the social
engineering period of the Warren Court. If this is true, we may
yet see significant work by the Supreme Court in the area of
choice of law, and it is suggested that there is no more appro-
priate subject than that of the issue of access to a forum. It is
sufficiently narrow to allow a meaningful contribution without
opening up the broader area of choice of law rules which may
not yet be ripe for work either by the Supreme Court or by Con-
gress. Whatever course the future may take, it is to be hoped
that it will be one which will increase the unity of our federal
system. The inclusion of the full faith and credit provisions in
the federal system was surely no accident and one can only hope
that the early reach for unity contained therein will yet prevail.
